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## NO NEED FOR SCAPEGOATS FOR CUBAN FIASCO.

THE hunt continues for scapegoats in the Cuban disaster. The American people have generally responded to the setback in a mature manner. We do not believe that they demand sacrificial offerings as some members of Congress and other Washington officials seem to think.

In the latest goat-seeking search, Sen. Albert Gore (D.Tenn.) has called for the replacement of all members of the joint chiefs of staff "by new, wiser and abler men." Gore thus puts himself in the position of a Monday morning quarterback who argues that the wrong players were on the field the previous Saturday afternoon. But the fact is that the joint chiefs are comprised of five officers with outstanding reputations and records. Gore's low rating for them is not supported by known facts.

Actually the public still doesn't know what went wrong in the Cuban adventure. An unnamed member of the cabinet early tried to pin part of the blame on ex-President Eisenhower. But the country quickly noted that President Kennedy personally assumed the full responsibility. The training of the Cuban expatriate forces began during the Eisenhower administration but, out of office, Eisenhower could not make the decision on

how and when to use them.

Central Intelligence agency and the present White House advisory staff in addition to the joint chiefs and the previous administration. It is clear that the CIA was deeply involved in the operation. There are numerous reports that the CIA is now slated for drastic revamping.

No doubt some corrective action is needed to diard against future bungling. It can be taken without recrimination. In retrospect, the Cuban venture should not have been undertaken. Aside from the bungling it went against an avowed U. S. principle of nonintervention in Latin America. But since the administration found overriding reasons to breach this principle, obviously no military measures should have been ordered unless they were reasonably sure of success.

But this is all in the past. The decision to stage the amphibious assault has cost the United States heavily in world prestige. Now the nation's effort is needed for a more constructive Latin American policy. The problem now is to repair the damage. The political head-hunters can best serve the country with judicious restraint.